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This paper describes the out-of-equilibrium approach to the analysis of
economic processes. We argue that such an approach is adapted to study quali-
tative (or structural) changes, like technical progress or changes in preferences.
Truly sequential analyses manage to capture the essential features of qualitative
change. In particular, we show how this approach shifts the focus from the issue
of optimality to the one of viability of the processes of change. The objective of
the paper is, first, to highlight the analytical elements of an out-of-equilibrium
approach, so as to serve as a guide for the construction of this type of models;
second to show, how this analysis allows to see controversial phenomena, like
for example the debate on wage rigidity or the productivity paradox in a new
and different light ; third to identify the real causes of the on-going crisis.
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The purpose of this article is twofold: first, to highlight the
interest of out-of-equilibrium analysis, that can as a first approxi-
mation be defined as the construction of models that allow dealing
with phenomena that are in the nature of qualitative change.
Changes, in other words, that entail modifications in the structure
of the economy, and that are in the nature of processes that take
place over time. An equilibrium analysis that, by its very nature, is
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limited to the comparison of equilibrium states (or paths), is not
apt to the analysis of what happens during the process triggered by
qualitative change. Out-of-equilibrium analysis allows studying
the process of change as a sequence of constrained choices: which,
as we shall see, shifts the focus from the question of optimality of
the path followed by an economy to its viability. 
The second purpose of the article is to detail the logical struc-
ture of out-of-equilibrium models, and to emphasize the necessary
analytical departures from the simplifying hypotheses used in
standard equilibrium analysis. This article should hence serve also
as a guide for the construction of this type of models.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 discusses the out-of-
equilibrium approach, emphasizing its departure from standard
equilibrium growth theory and its methodological pillars. Section 2
expounds the logical structure of a typical out-of-equilibrium
model, based on a sequential structure and on irreversibility in
production and in decision making. Section 3 shows how this
approach allows shedding a different light on some long standing
controversies such as, e.g., the desirability of wage rigidity or the
so-called “productivity paradox”. It will be shown that the specific
results obtained hint at more general conclusions that are a guide
line for policy interventions quite different and sometimes oppo-
site to those inspired by the prevailing equilibrium analytical
approach. We conclude the paper by stressing the relevance of our
approach for a better understanding of the current crisis and
possible ways out of it (section 4). The analytical elements are
finally discussed in an appendix.
1. The out-of-equilibrium approach
Most processes of economic change are not 'quantitative'—that
is, a simple modification of the intensity of a given functioning of
the economy—but 'qualitative' changes, that is, changes in the
very way of functioning (like changes in technology, a speeding up
of the growth rate, the introduction of new products, the entering
of new markets, the irruption of new countries and new firms in
the international trade, changes in the distribution of income, and
so on). This means by definition the breaking of equilibrium. It
implies the disruption of the existing productive structure, on
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which the behaviour of the economy depends, and the construc-
tion of a new and different one. This is a process that takes time,
and the market economy is not necessarily self-adjusting. Co-ordi-
nation failures are unavoidable, because problems of co-ordination
arise in the first place in the production process itself. These
problems, on the other hand, extend to the whole economic
system. New goods or techniques imply new types of production
processes and new activities that, in turn, call for new forms of
interaction among the existing agents and institutions, or even the
appearance of new actors and institutions. The heterogeneity of
the agents involved is an essential feature of processes of structural
change, as we shall stress in what follows.
The viability of the process of change, and even its outcome, are
not predetermined, but depend on the way the co-ordination
problems, both at the micro and macro level, are dealt with. Diffe-
rent outcomes may in fact be associated, e.g., with a given
technological advance, depending on the effective development of
the process, i.e. in the way in which co-ordination is (or is not)
restored. As a matter of fact, technical changes that potentially
allow for substantial increases in productivity may actually result,
at the end of the process, in a waste of productive resources.
The focus on processes of change has momentous analytical
implications. In the first place, the usual distinction between a
long-term, where equilibrium obtains, and a disequilibrium short
term disappears1. A process is neither a short nor a long term: it is a
sequence of linked disequilibria that shape the evolution of the
process itself. This is no longer seen as a transition path between
equilibrium positions. In an out-of-equilibrium perspective the
point of arrival becomes blurred. It is lost to sight, not necessarily
in the sense that it ceases to exist, but because everything that
matters is inside the process.
The analysis of this process does not call for a traditional type of
model, that is, a model capable of generating a 'solution' in the
sense of a behavior of the economy characterized by certain
1. The standard view, which considers trend and cycle as unrelated phenomena, is misleading.
“When we turn our attention to long-run questions, we aren’t turning away from co-ordination
and adjustment problems, we are simply looking at them from a different perspective” (Howitt,
1994, p. 765).
Mario Amendola, Jean-Luc Gaffard and Francesco Saraceno266
specific features (efficiency, optimality, and so forth). What
becomes important, instead, is to follow the evolution of the
economy, traced out step by step by the sequence of disequilibria.
The essence of a thorough process is in its going on, that is, in its
being viable. This calls for a monitoring of the process itself to
bring to light its salient moments: which can only be achieved by
means of numerical experiments, that is, by simulations that,
under certain conditions (chosen so as to stress aspects relevant to
the analysis) allow to unveil what happens “along the way”.
In this light also the usual distinction between the terms 'exoge-
nous' and 'endogenous' must be interpreted in a different way. “In
a model there are variables and there are parameters, which reflect
the existing constraints. In the standard analysis the constraints,
which exist outside and above the economy and which determine
its behaviour, are taken to be exogenous. But once we recognize
that the time over which change takes place is an irreversible
process that shapes the change itself, ‘it is impossible to assume the
constancy of anything over time}...The only truly exogenous factor
is whatever exists at a given moment of time, as a heritage of the past’
(Kaldor, 1985, p.61). While the standard approach focuses on the
right place to draw the line between what should be taken as exog-
enous and what should be considered instead as endogenous in
economic modelling—a line that moves according to what we
want to be explained by the model—out of equilibrium the ques-
tion is no longer that of drawing a line here or there but rather one
of the time perspective adopted. Everything can be considered as
given at a certain moment of time, while everything becomes
endogenous over time” (Amendola and Gaffard, 1998, pp.32-3).
Out-of-equilibrium, oscillations no longer appear as short-term
deviations due to demand shocks from a long-term trend deter-
mined beforehand by fundamentals alone. Focusing on co-
ordination mechanisms implies to recognize that the short term
actually determines what the long term will be, and that supply
conditions and demand conditions interact with each other.
Finally, it must be stressed that different evolution paths can be
associated in fact to given fundamentals, according to how the
out-of-equilibrium process actually evolves, and the fundamentals
themselves undergo a change during this process, given the very
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definition of qualitative change. The 'fundamentals', in other
words, are no longer fundamental.
A framework that helps dealing with the co-ordination problems
concerning the heterogeneity of the entities involved in out-of-
equilibrium paths is Agent Based Modelling (ABM), that “seeks to
model the process by which one among many possible futures is
selected, rather than imposing constraints on the model that
ensure only a single equilibrium outcome” (Mehrling, 2006, p. 77).
With this kind of model, ‘agent’ refers broadly to an encapsulated
collection of data and methods representing an entity residing in a
computationally constructed world. Individual biological life
forms, social groupings, institutions, and physical entities can all be
represented as agents” (LeBaron and Tesfatsion, 2008, p. 246).
Our sequence analysis shares most of the properties of ABM
modelling, namely, heterogeneity of agents, bounded rationality,
and non-market clearing. Here, those are production processes of
different ages, and incorporating different technologies, which are
represented as agents. Economic dynamics is mainly driven by the
evolution of the composition of these processes, that is, by the
time structure of productive capacity.
2. The logical structure of the model
The main objective of out-of equilibrium models is to allow the
study of processes of change. Standard equilibrium analysis is
carried out by comparison of equilibria, be them points or steady
state paths. Transitional dynamics are most of the time neglected
because inherently short term phenomena, and because they are
pre-determined from the beginning, and as such not particularly
informative (for example, the saddle path adjustment). It was
argued above that a meaningful analysis of the transition may add
substantial information to our understanding of the economy,
notably as regards the viability of the out-of-equilibrium path
undertaken following a structural change of the economy. This
section aims at discussing the building blocks of out-of-equili-
brium models, without reference to any specific set of equations.
Some examples may be found in the appendix.
Out-of-equilibrium analysis shows that once we release some
simplifying assumptions of standard equilibrium theory, ongoing
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processes of change become interesting to study because, far from
being pre-determined, they are shaped by the interaction of agent's
behavior, institutional factors, and environmental characteristics.
The starting point is a standard general equilibrium model, with
households and price-setting firms using labor and capital. Typical
examples of this type of models may come from the New Keyne-
sian literature (see e.g., Woodford, 2003).
It is important to notice that the use of capital is not strictly
necessary, as it can be substituted by dated labor as was for the
example the case in classical analysis (see the discussion in Gare-
gnani, 1984).
A sequential analysis focuses both on the supply and on the
demand side of the economy. As for the supply side, the standard
hypothesis to be dropped is the perfect substitutability of factors
(usually embedded in a Cobb-Douglas production function) and
the instantaneous utilization of labor and capital. In out-of-equili-
brium models, production takes time, and is characterized by
complementarity rather than substitutability of the production
factors. This complementarity can be modeled through the defini-
tion of a productive process as a scheme by which a flow of labor
inputs is converted into a flow of output and the consideration of a
construction period, with inputs but no final output, which is
followed by a running-it period (Hicks, 1970; Hicks, 1973). It can
also modeled by using a CES function with a sufficient degree of
complementarity between capital/dated labor) and labor (the limit
case would be a standard Leontief function).
Analytically, time-to-build and complementarity are both
necessary, as they create sunk costs, and make choices at a certain
moment in time depend on the stock of capital/dated labor avai-
lable for the firm. Suppose for example that you had no
complementarity. Then no matter what their past choices and the
stock of capital/dated labor were, firms would always be able to
choose the desired level of output through an appropriate choice
of factor quantities.
A second simplifying assumption, rational expectations, also
prevents fully-fledged transitional dynamics. In out-of-equilibrium
analysis agents have bounded rationality, especially when facing
complex environments. “Innovativeness raises uncertainties. The
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future outcome of an innovative action poses ambiguity: the law of
‘unanticipated consequences’ applies (Merton, 1936) entrepre-
neurs have to act on their ‘animal spirits’, as John Maynard Keynes
(1936) put it; in the view of Friedrich Hayek (2002), innovations
are launched first, the benefit and the cost are ‘discovered’ afte-
rward” (Phelps, 2007, p. 544). A backward-looking component of
expectation formation is necessary for reasons analogous to time-
to-build, i.e. to create a link between past and current actions, and
hence to link periods into a sequence. While there is some ground
for rejecting backward looking behavior in equilibrium models, it
is much more difficult to do so in out-of-equilibrium contexts, in
which “knowledge of the model” is of little use, and in which at
least short term fluctuations, cannot be properly predicted. In
these situations, agents usually resort to “rules of thumb” that
resemble the adaptive behavior embedded in out-of-equilibrium
models (see for example Hommes, 1998).
A third important simplifying assumption of standard theory is
market clearing. Instantaneous price adjustments rule out, by defi-
nition, the possibility of disequilibrium. In sequential analysis, this
assumption is released in order to allow the emergence of quantity
constraints (the short side rule), and undesired stocks (both real
and financial). These stocks contribute to link the periods in a
sequence. This does not mean, of course, that prices do not
change: “The fix-price method is a disequilibrium method [...] If
flow demand is less than flow supply, a stock will have to be
carried over; we say here that it has to be carried over, for the alter-
native policy of cutting price so as to dispose of them within the
current period is not seriously considered. (And is not that, very
often, realistic?) [...] In describing this model as a fix-price model,
it is not assumed that prices are unchanging over time, or from one
single period to its successor; only that they do not necessarily
change whenever there is demand-supply disequilibrium.” (Hicks,
1956, p. 232).
Finally, out-of-equilibrium agents may be constrained, in their
transactions, by financial resources availability, strictly relevant in a
context where costs are dissociated in time from receipts. This can
be obtained by introducing missing markets, or more simply,
through cash-in-advance constraints. The first road is necessary if
the focus is on the working of credit and financial markets. The out-
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of-equilibrium literature, so far, has been more concerned with a
macroeconomic approach, and hence has made use of cash-in-
advance constraint that emerges because markets open sequentially.
All the modifications to the standard approach listed above
have been extensively used in the literature. As for price rigidity,
the early reappraisal of Keynes’s economics (Clower, 1965; Leijon-
hufvud, 1968) or temporary equilibrium models (Hicks, 1939;
Malinvaud, 1977; Bénassy, 1982), assume that prices only adjust
between periods. Nevertheless, by releasing the hypothesis of full
rationality, out-of-equilibrium analysis has to deal with the appea-
rance of unsold stocks. The New Keynesian literature (Clarida, Gali
and Gertler, 1999; Woodford, 2003) also makes reference to a
monopolistic competition sticky prices environment, emphasizing
short run quantity adjustments in response to shocks, even if in a
context in which fluctuations are exclusively technology driven.
Time-to-build has also been extensively studied (Kydland and Pres-
cott, 1982), usually (but not only) in RBC type models, although
not with reference to fully vertically integrated production
processes. Finally cash-in-advance and credit constraints are rather
commonly studied in the mainstream literature.
Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, these hypotheses
were never considered jointly, so that their potential to analyze
sequential economies has not been fully exploited (Saraceno,
2004). It is easy to see why their interaction is relevant when we are
interested in analyzing out-of-equilibrium dynamics: each period
begins with state variables determined in the previous one, and
with imbalances that constrain agents in their subsequent deci-
sions. Expectations and the structure of productive capacity
further link the periods in a sequence. As a consequence, it is
impossible to consider each period in isolation, as for example in
the temporary equilibrium literature. A shock (no matter of what
type) disrupts the coordination between agents and between
phases of production (construction and utilization) that characte-
rizes the equilibrium. Ex ante disequilibria (i.e. inconsistency of
agent's plans) within the period are eliminated by rationing and
stock accumulation rather than by price adjustments. The "success"
of the subsequent transition lies in the ability of the system in
recovering coordination.
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In order to embed the assumptions above into a coherent
framework, out-of-equilibrium models are usually built into a
sequence. The sequential opening of markets (for financial
resources, for labor, and for goods) creates binding constraints. The
sequence broadly speaking consists of three different moments
(the equation numbers refer to the equations in the appendix):
(A) At the end of every period we have a number of state variables:
— The productive capacity, represented by a population of
processes, or by a stock of dated labour (see eqs A.3 and A.4)
he stocks (of goods or financial means) in the hands of
agents (that appeared as rationing in the previous period
(eq. A.8). A set of prices and wages
— Some stock variables as labor supply or total money/credit
supply.
(B) At the junction between periods
— If imbalances in the labor and goods markets appeared,
wages and prices change (eqs. A.6 or A.7).
— The productive capacity 'ages': every productive process
becomes one year older.
(C) In the new period things happen in the following order:
— On the production side firms determine, based on expecta-
tions (eq. A.5), and the stocks left from the previous period,
both the desired quantity to be produced and investment.
— In the next step the desired production is compared with the
productive capacity. This may either result in a constraint, or
in a decision to keep part of productive capacity idle (equiva-
lently, scrapping of processes can occur).
— Once desired/feasible production is determined, firms can
compute the wage bill necessary to carry on production, and
investment. The difference between the desired wage fund
and available internal resources gives the amount of external
financing required by firms.
— The short side rule (eq. A.8). then determines (given the
supply from helicopter money or the financial sector) the
equilibrium quantity of financial resources. If the demand
side is rationed, investment and production are affected, and
this alters the structure of productive capacity.
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— After taking into account all the constraints affecting desired
production, we can compute labor demand. The labor
market opens, and demand and supply are matched. If ratio-
ning occurs (eq. A.8)., either unemployment or non desired
money balances by firms appear
— Production takes place, and wages are paid. This allows
computing aggregate demand for the goods.
—  The matching of demand and supply in the goods markets is
the final step, and the short side rule (eq. A.8). determines
unsold stocks or non-desired money holdings by households.
While the details (on utility, technology, rationing, financial
markets) may change, most out-of-equilibrium models share a
sequential structure of this type that allows analyzing at each step
the emergence of constraints affecting the subsequent choices (a
constraint-decision-constraint sequence). Laying down the sequence
allows to realize that problems in the matching of demand and
supply may arise because of a number of constraints. A firm may
fail to meet the demand it expects because it has not enough
productive capacity, or because it faces a human resources
constraint, or again because it fails to raise the funding needed to
pay for wages and investment. In other words, problem of coordi-
nation may arise for a number of reasons, and the smooth
functioning of the economy along a regular path appears to be the
exception rather than the norm.
As a consequence of a change in the environment (the appea-
rance of a new and superior technology, the degree of extent of the
market due to a change in the distribution of income or to the
globalisation of the economy), firms have to adapt their productive
capacity, in fact they have to adopt a new one adapted to the new
environment. In any case, the new productive capacity must be
built before being used. And most of the time, there is a divorce
between the investment in terms of capacity and the investment at
cost. Whatever the reason for changing, the new capacity requires a
higher construction cost more than compensated by a lower utilisa-
tion cost. This inevitably creates distortions in the structure of
productive capacity, which engender fluctuations in output and
employment. As a matter of fact, in absence of a change in the
external resources available for carrying production processes, the
investment in capacity decreases and, mechanically, after a while,
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the final output decreases with the consequence of diminishing the
level of employment as well as the level of productivity. This is the
result of coordination failures due to both irreversibility of invest-
ment decisions and imperfection of market information. What
really happens along the way is the consequence of the distortion
in the structure of production capacity, which the main event asso-
ciated with any structural change (and the main property of our
model). It will depend on the reaction of agents, that is, the way in
which firms reacts to successive market disequilibria and govern-
ment reacts to global imbalances (unemployment, inflation
pressures).
3. Macroeconomic controversies revisited
An out-of-equilibrium analytical perspective allows shedding a
different light on issues that have been at the center of important
debates in macroeconomics. 
The prevailing policy consensus, reflecting the equilibrium
view of the existence of unique attractors defined with respect to
the properties of technological changes and/or other fundamen-
tals, maintains that the long term must prevail over the short term,
that the supply conditions are more important than the demand
conditions.
In an out-of-equilibrium perspective—where short term oscilla-
tions appear no longer as deviations from a fixed trend but rather
as the way in which a process of change takes shape and gets
realised—the short term actually determines what the long term
will be, supply conditions and demand conditions interact with
each other and there is a strict relation between the distribution
and the creation of wealth, that is, between equity and efficiency.
These are the general methodological conclusions that result
from the analysis of some relevant theoretical issues and contro-
versies, presented in the following sections: conclusions that
provide a guide line for policy interventions quite different and
sometimes opposite to those inspired by the prevailing equilibrium
analytical approach. For all the controversies listed below, here we
only want to give a sense of how the out-of-equilibrium approach
allows gaining a different perspective from equilibrium analysis.
While the structure of the models used broadly corresponds to
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what we outlined in the previous section, we refer the reader to the
cited papers for details on the specific choices made in each of the
models.
3.1. Wage rigidity and keynesian unemployment
In an equilibrium construct in which markets are complete, the
price vector conveys all the information necessary to fully coordi-
nate agent's decisions. In this framework, unemployment can only
stem from nominal rigidities in the relevant market, namely the
one for labor.
The focus on flexibility comes from Neo-classical and New
Keynesian models which both explain involuntary unemployment
as the result of real wage rigidity. The Neo-classical analysis also
postulates a positive correlation between nominal and real wages
(generally confirmed by empirical observations), so that any cut in
money wages should result in a cut in real wages. As a conse-
quence, money wage rigidities associated with some specific
institutional rules would be responsible for involuntary unemploy-
ment and should be reduced. The New-Keynesian analysis focuses
on the bargaining arrangements on the labor market. In particular,
entrepreneurs would fix a real wage rate above the equilibrium
one—the efficiency wage—in order to induce the workers to reveal
their actual level of productivity Stiglitz (1987). Once again, better
information would result in a lower real wage and a higher
employment level. 
According to Keynes, the persistence of unemployment is due
to a fall in the marginal efficiency of capital, which is not compen-
sated by an equivalent fall in the real interest rate. In other words,
it is due to capital market imperfections. "It was Keynes' position
that it is the failure of the incomplete market mechanism to
reconcile the implied values of forward demand and supplies [...]
that is the source of the trouble. Unemployment of labor and other
resources is a derivative phenomenon" (Leijonhufvud, 1968,
p. 276). Co-ordination failures at the system level rather than
failures in the labor market are responsible for unemployment,
which will therefore be involuntary in the strict sense. In this
context, disequilibria on the labor market call for wage adjust-
ments, but a fall in the money wage and in the price level, far from
leading to a decrease in the real wage and a re-absorption of unem-
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ployment, results in a debt deflation process and a cumulative
depression. The reason invoked by Keynes is that wage bargains
between entrepreneurs and workers do not determine the real
wage, and ‘there may exist no expedient by which labour as a
whole can reduce its real wage to a given figure by making revised
money bargains with the entrepreneurs’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 13). 
If the “source of the trouble” does not lie in the labor market,
whose disequilibrium is only a “derivative phenomenon”, the
hypothesis of fixed wages that stirred so much controversy
acquires a very precise meaning. Keynes writes that "if money-
wages were to fall without limit whenever there was a tendency for
less than full employment, [...] there would be no resting place
below full employment until either the rate of interest was inca-
pable of falling further, or wages were zero. In fact, we must have
some factor, the value of which in terms of money is, if not fixed,
at least sticky, to give us any stability of values in a monetary
system" (Keynes, 1936, p. 303). Keynes reverses the common
wisdom on wage rigidity that, in his framework, becomes a neces-
sary institutional feature to avoid the implosion of the system
rather than a source of disequilibrium.
The crucial role of co-ordination, however, is better tackled by
abandoning the equilibrium approach that also characterises
Keynes’ General Theory, and by seeing the working of the economy
as a sequential out-of-equilibrium process (Amendola, Gaffard and
Saraceno, 2004b; Saraceno, 2004). This is a complex process that
originates on the production side of the economy, but involves all
the relevant economic variables, as discussed in the previous
section. Involuntary unemployment appears then as the result of a
lack of co-ordination that emerges in the economy as a whole
along the way, at each step, and cannot disappear simply by
allowing price and wage flexibility. As a matter of fact, the stan-
dard treatment for taking care of unemployment, a reduction in
wages, may result in a sequential process and in further distortions
of productive capacity rather than in re-establishing co-ordination
and hence re-absorbing unemployment.
Whatever the nature of the original shock experienced by the
economy, it implies a distortion of its productive capacity, the
dissociation in time of costs and proceeds, a reduction in the
resources allocated to investments and hence in the demand for
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labor. Consequently income earned by the workers and their
demand is reduced. An excess supply appears in the market for
final output, and undesired real stocks cumulate. The production
demanded no longer matches the existing productive capacity,
and the firms scrap some processes in the utilisation phase. As
production drops, the excess supply on the labor market persists.
An excess of demand may then appear on the market for final
output so that we can have an alternation of excesses of supply and
demand that, by amplifying the distortion of productive capacity,
result in ever increasing fluctuations of the economy. These can be
either reduced or amplified according to whether co-ordination is
successfully re-established or less. The prevailing wage regime has
an essential role in this. Flexibility interpreted as quick adjustment
feeds over-reactions in one or the other direction that result in a
stronger alternation of excesses of supply and demand, and
amplify the distortion of productive capacity. The relation
between employment and flexibility then appears under a comple-
tely different light. Employment is in fact the result of a complex
adjustment process and depends on how this process actually
evolves. Price variability implies trading at false prices that create
constraints and incentives, which in turn induce firms to take
wrong production and investment decisions. Thus the problem lies
not so much in the persistence of a wrong price than in the effects
of an excessive variability of prices on the structure of productive
capacity. In this case a certain wage rigidity prevents the fluctua-
tions from becoming too strong and representing a threat to the
viability of the economy. However, as the source of the problem is
not in the labour market but in the conditions under which the
investment creates, amplifies or eliminates distortions in the
productive capacity of the economy, the issue of flexibility versus
rigidity should be viewed in the light of how the investment issue
is taken care of. If the latter is properly dealt with, it does not
matter how flexible wages are: the wage–employment dilemma
does not exist.
Prices and wages volatility induces quantity and hence invest-
ment volatility, that is, distortions in the age structure of
productive capacity, which are responsible for stronger and
stronger fluctuations of final output. By the way, in case of techno-
logical change, reducing the real wage would be at the opposite of
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what should happen as the consequence of a higher labour produc-
tivity level.
3.2. Financial constraints and monetary policy
The dissociation in time of inputs from output and costs from
proceeds that characterizes every structural change calls for a
central role of liquidity in ensuring the viability of the processes of
change. Additional liquidity is required to build the bridge
through time at the heart of the production process, destroyed by
the distortion of productive capacity: and this can only be the
outcome of an external intervention. Credit, or money creation,
have the crucial role of re-establishing consistency over time of
construction and utilization, investment and consumption, supply
and demand. This is a general feature of out-of-equilibrium
models, but was studied in detail in (Amendola and Gaffard, 1998;
Amendola et al., 2004b) where it is shown that the provision of
liquidity must be articulated over time so as to properly interact
with the modification in the structure of productive capacity
which is taking place sequentially; which means, in particular,
being harmonized with the time profile of internally generated
financial resources during the process of change. Following a posi-
tive technology shock, although the natural rate of interest should
finally increase, during the transition the lack of financial
resources makes it necessary to conduct a loose monetary policy. It
will be carried out through a reduction in the monetary interest
rate, which will respond to the temporary reduction in the produc-
tivity growth rate of the economy2. This monetary policy allows
minimizing both the output gap and the inflation rate over a given
period of time, because it allows minimizing the distortions in the
structure of productive capacity.
A policy dilemma is typical of economies that follow out-of-
equilibrium paths (Amendola et al., 2004b). Innovation requires
"to transmute the capital that was embodied in the late stages of
old production processes into capital embodied in the early stages
of new processes, that is a disruption of other activities which is
'bound to be a strain'" (Hicks, 1989, p. 535). Then inflationary pres-
2. The reasons why an initial fall in productivity is usually associated with a process of
structural change will be explored in detail in the next section.
Mario Amendola, Jean-Luc Gaffard and Francesco Saraceno278
sures (and/or deficits in the trade balance in open economies)
necessarily appear "because the goods in which the wages (...) will
be spent (...) cannot be provided out of the product of the labour
which is newly employed, for that is not yet ready" (ibid.). Central
banks can try to bring inflation back to the target level as soon as
possible, with the consequence of exacerbating the initial negative
impact of the shock on output and employment. They can, alter-
natively, decide an accommodating monetary policy bringing
inflation back to the target more slowly with the consequence of
simultaneously reducing inflation and unemployment (Amendola,
Gaffard and Saraceno, 2004a). The latter policy consists in accep-
ting a transitory inflation in the perspective of reducing
unemployment. Later on, when and if co-ordination of the
production process and the flow of internally generated financial
resources are re-established, a restrictive monetary policy may be
required to hamper the arising of inflationary pressures. These
results hence call for a conduct of monetary policy substantially
more articulated than a simple inflation-targeting rule, or even a
Taylor rule. Monetary policy needs by its very nature to be discre-
tionary, because it needs to accommodate the changing needs of
the economy during the transition process.
3.3. Appropriating the potential gains of technology: The 
productivity paradox
The standard representation of production and technology,
forces to consider unemployment as an equilibrium phenomenon.
Its natural rate is determined by 'fundamentals' in a wide (i.e. not
only referred to labor market features) sense. Unemployment is
seen "as shaped by the structure of the economy rather than its
recent history: technology, individual preferences, social values
and institutions" (Phelps and Zoega, 1998, p. 783). Shocks—inclu-
ding temporary productivity shocks—may in the short run produce
disequilibrium transitory effects on employment due to adjust-
ments failures or lags; but in the long run only changes in the
fundamentals—e.g. in the productivity growth rate—may explain
changes in the natural rate. This, among other things, should
account for the fact that "unemployment rates viewed over the very
long run...appear to be un-trended in most nations, despite tremen-
dous increases in productivity" (Blanchard and Katz,1997, p.56).
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In the equilibrium framework technological advances should be
instantaneously mapped into increases in productivity, and the
only way to explain the ‘productivity paradox’—a fall in producti-
vity, we remember, notwithstanding the introduction of a superior
technique in terms of production coefficients—is to assume adop-
tion delays (Amendola, Gaffard and Saraceno, 2005). This happens
because in the standard representation of technology, productivity
is built into the production function as a given relationship
between inputs and output. Such a representation needs an equili-
brium framework, in which the ratios between the factors and
output are constant and corresponding to those dictated by the
production function coefficients. 
If productivity is seen instead as the outcome of an out-of-equi-
librium process, triggered by a technological shock, then the
potential gains of a superior technology may only be appropriated
if agents succeed in reshaping the productive capacity (whose
distinguishing feature is to be temporally articulated), and in reco-
vering the intertemporal co-ordination disrupted by the
introduction of the new technique. Physical, human, and financial
capital are complementary in this process of reshaping, and may
constrain each other. The outcome of the disequilibrium process
depends then on the interaction of accumulation choices, lear-
ning, and money supply rules. 
The out-of-equilibrium analysis, we have seen, makes it possible
to show how a shock of any kind brings about first and foremost a
distortion of the existing productive capacity due to a breaking of
the intertemporal complementarity of the production process.
This implies the appearance of disequilibria, and hence of
problems of co-ordination that extend to all aspects of economic
activity (resulting, for example, in inflation, unemployment, and
so on). Reactions to these disequilibria stimulate a process of
adjustment sketched out by sequentially interacting disequilibria,
which will amplify or dampen the original deformation of the
structure of productive capacity—and hence create or eliminate
viability problems—according to the working of the co-ordination
mechanisms along the way. If co-ordination is not re-established,
this will result in particular in increasing levels of unemployment,
and decreasing levels of productivity and real wages (Amendola et
al., 2005).
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Consider the case of the introduction of a new technology
characterised by higher construction costs, as it is typical of the
new information and communication technologies. The costs
come earlier, and hence cannot be financed out of current produc-
tion This causes a distortion of productive capacity and the
dissociation in time of inputs from output, and of costs from
receipts, which puts a financial constraint on investment in capa-
city. The availability of financial resources at the right time is then
essential to build a bridge over time between costs and revenues, so
as to render the required restructuring of productive capacity viable
while it is still on the way and does not yet deliver output and reve-
nues. If these resources are not available, the necessary investment
cannot be realised, which will further reduce final output and post-
pone (or even cast doubts on the effective obtainment of) the
expected increases in productivity. What we shall have in the
meantime is less production and less labor demand. Unemploy-
ment, lower revenues and the subsequent fall in final demand will
further reduce receipts and financial resources. Insufficient invest-
ments will paradoxically result in excess supply, excessive
productive capacity and in the scrapping of production processes.
And so on, in a process that is a threat to the viability of the change
undertaken. Viability that, therefore, calls for the kind of discretio-
nary monetary policy described in the preceding section.
This process also occurs if the new technology requires a diffe-
rent gamut of skills. We shall immediately have the appearance of
a human resource constraint, taking the form of a labour
mismatch, which implies the co-existence of unemployment and
unfilled vacancies (for lower and higher skills respectively). Once
again this will result in lower investment and hence in a subse-
quent fall in revenues and final demand. Unemployment thus
reveals the existence of co-ordination problems at the economy
level. It cannot be reduced to a matching problem, to be solved
thanks to appropriate changes in the regulations of the labour
market or appropriate actions that would allow workers to learn
new competencies. 
Of course, with a fully rational behaviour making available the
financial resources aimed at covering balanced investment
expenses, equilibrium will be maintained or mechanically re-esta-
blished. But this simply means wiping out by assumption the co-
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ordination problems that arise along a process of qualitative
change and the implied requirement of a macroeconomic manage-
ment of the process itself. 
The above scenario illustrates the productivity paradox, that is,
a fall in productivity notwithstanding the introduction of a supe-
rior technique in terms of production coefficients. There is a
divorce between the productivity of the technique, which can only
be verified in an economy already in the equilibrium state asso-
ciated with the technique itself, and the effective productivity of
the economy resulting from how the out-of-equilibrium process of
transition takes place. This divorce has nothing to do with the
specific character of the technique concerned; it depends on the
co-ordination problems that arise in the transition process from an
old technique to a new one. 
3.4. Trade and domestic distortions
Comparative advantages postulate that an increase of
exchanges between countries is generally beneficial to all partners.
Importing new goods and services, even when these goods were
previously domestically produced, creates new opportunities and
allows the use of productive resources in a more efficient way. The
loss of manufacturing jobs due to the growing import penetration
is generally offset by the job creation effect of growing exports.
International trade is thus a positive sum game and cannot be held
responsible for increasing unemployment, waste of resources, and
low growth.
However, old as well as more recent analyses demonstrate the
possibility of losses for some participants to the exchange. These
losses would be essentially due to differences in productivity gains
among countries, which result in differences in real income (Hicks,
1953; Krugman, 1985; Gomory and Baumol, 2000; Samuelson,
2004). These models deal with the welfare effects for a country
when a part of domestic production is taken over by its trading
partner, generally a less advanced country. Usually, changes in
international trade result in widespread gains if there are no
obstacles to prevent the redistribution of productive resources
among sectors that allows the convergence toward the full employ-
ment equilibrium. Within the standard analytical framework,
these considerations lead to focus on the role played by wage
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adjustments and distortions associated with them. For the gains
from trade and relocation to materialize, it is essential that no
domestic distortion prevents the necessary adjustment (i.e. the
convergence towards the full employment equilibrium). Changes
in fundamentals (technology and preferences) must be accommo-
dated by relative prices (in particular wages). In this case,
relocation and outsourcing only correspond to a better allocation
of resources at the international level without harmful conse-
quences on employment. Increasing imports will be matched by
increasing exports.
Out of equilibrium models are not concerned by the final
welfare effects of changing trading patterns, but with the positive
implications of the transition process. One cannot deny that
changes in international trade entail social and distributional
costs: “An irony that is not sufficiently appreciated in the public
debate is that the economist's case for gains from trade relies
heavily on the restructuring of national economies by the forces of
trade: specialization requires restructuring. While re- structuring
may take different forms, in most cases it is likely to have distribu-
tional impacts-both in the short term as a consequence of
adjustment costs and in the long-term as a result of permanent
changes in relative factor demands. One might even say that the
dislocations and distributional consequences produced by trade
are the flip side of the efficiency gains. No pain, no gain!” (Rodrik,
1998, p.6).
The restructuring mentioned by Rodrik is an intrinsic feature of
globalization and of relocation processes. In fact, increasing
openness is a form of structural change and, hence, analytically
equivalent to technical progress; as such, it entails the destruction
of existing productive capacity (and of the corresponding jobs),
and the construction of something new to replace it. Changes in
international trade go hand-to-hand with the breaking-up of the
pre-existing industrial and spatial structure of productive capacity,
which results in unavoidable disequilibria between supply and
demand of final goods, all along the transition towards the new
adapted structure of the economy. Thus, the supply side, in parti-
cular investment, becomes crucial for the transition to a new
steady state. It is therefore pointless, when not harmful, to try to
bypass the transition and the associated turbulence by eliminating
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price distortions. Policy should rather accompany the process of
change, progressively removing or softening the constraint faced
by the economy.
 The out-of-equilibrium approach allows to push Rodrik's argu-
ment even further, by arguing that this process of restructuring
does not necessarily converge to the new equilibrium: the ex ante
benefits from increased openness may ex post fail to materialize, if
something goes wrong with the co-ordination process. Thus, the
process of restructuring needs not to be successful. The viability of
the transition and the recovery of coordination crucially hinge
upon the right mix of institutional and policy factors, notably in
access to credit.
A two sector oligopolistic model that is subject to an external
demand shock (Gaffard and Saraceno, 2012). Firms can migrate
between sectors, following relative profits, but need to adapt their
productive capacity to the new sector of activity. The natural
tendency of the system to converge to the new steady state equili-
brium corresponding to a different demand structure may be
hampered by excessive variations in wages and/or by too fast
migration between sectors; these may trigger, via aggregate
demand effects, an important drop in the investment capacity of
firms. In turn, if this lack of resources is not compensated by the
credit sector, the insufficient investment disrupts the productive
capacity of the economy, and triggers a cumulative explosive
process. Therefore, re-establishing the coordination between
investment and consumption and reabsorbing unemployment
requires an accommodating credit policy, and a sufficiently slow
change in wages on the one side and on migration rates on the
other. Excessive rigidity, on the other hand, will result in a new
equilibrium permanently characterized by unemployment. The
paper concludes therefore that there is a sort of “optimal” degree of
flexibility for the economy.
4. The current crisis from an out-of-equilibrium perspective
As already stressed, any structural change is a process of deve-
lopment defined as “disturbance of equilibrium, which forever
alters and displaces the equilibrium state previously existing”
(Schumpeter, 1934, p. 64). The on-going crisis is clearly a moment
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of such a process, and should be analysed in this perspective. Of
course, financial (mis)behaviours have played an essential role in
triggering the crisis. But, its roots are real. Technological shocks,
growth strategies carried out by emergent countries, and, most
important, dramatic changes in the income distribution, have
generated large distortions in the structure of productive capacity
in several countries. These have resulted in the involuntary accu-
mulation of real and financial stocks. 
Thus, the on-going crisis should have led to understand and
address the policy mistakes that prevented the world economy
from fully adjusting to the unavoidable structural changes, rather
than to propose the same recipes that prevailed before the crisis. As
a matter of fact, capitalism is submitted to recurrent structural
changes and its survival depends on the way co-ordination takes
place. Private (market) or public (policy) co-ordination will be
successful when leading to the harmonisation between supply and
demand at each moment of time and over time, that is, when
smoothing adjustment processes. This co-ordination consists in
arbitrages between conflicting objectives, but also requires a
harmonisation of interests, which in turn is possible only through
a fair distribution of income.
The sequence of events that have been observed can be
explained with reference to the analytical construct described
above, i.e. by focusing on the divorce between investment and
consumption that characterized most countries.
The US crisis can be interpreted as the consequence of the way a
deep structural change, mostly linked to technological advances,
has been managed. During a first phase, financial markets and
monetary policy have allowed investments in new technologies to
be easily financed (Amendola et al., 2005). But delayed reaction to
the building up of disequilibria led to overinvestment and to the
emergence of a stock market bubble that eventually burst. In the
second phase, the indebtedness of households belonging to poor
and middle classes compensated the increased income inequality
that should have had a negative effect on final demand and on the
potential growth rate (Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2010; 2011). Indeb-
tedness would have created inflationary pressure and would have
led the Federal Reserve to apply a tight monetary policy, if the gap
between domestic supply and demand for final goods had not
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been filled by imports from emerging countries. To summarize,
imbalances in the structure of productive capacity have opened the
way to cumulative disequilibria (both real and financial, domestic
and foreign) that have resulted in a great contraction.
The EU crisis is a different story. During two decades large Euro-
pean countries have experienced a lower growth rate that has
ended in increasing budget deficits. This has been the result of a
restrictive monetary policy that compressed inflation, but also
prevented adequate investments in new technologies. In other
words, the transition to the new productive capacity that would
have incorporated new technologies has not been completed
(Amendola et al., 2005). Nevertheless there were no strong imba-
lances between investment and consumption that would have
rendered unviable this slow growth path. A serious problem arose
during the 2000’s, when Germany adopted a strategy that has
consisted in stimulating exports while constraining its domestic
demand with labor market reforms (Carlin and Soskice, 2008). This
has resulted in a divorce between Germany and other European
countries, that is, between a country with a current-account
surplus and countries with deficits, that contributed to the crisis of
the Euro in 2011. A strong imbalance between domestic invest-
ment and consumption in Germany required a high level of
consumption in some other developed countries. Decreasing inte-
rest rates in the euro zone periphery and available funds in
particular from German banks have fuelled housing bubbles, speci-
fically in Spain, where a symmetric distortion has arisen: domestic
consumption was no longer in line with investment in new
productive capacity.
In China, excessive inequality, and an insufficient provision of
welfare (in particular health care and pensions), led to the neces-
sity of an export led growth and to the ensuing accumulation of
assets. Given the large (and sometimes excessive) investment
driving the fast growth carried out, only increased exports of goods
have allowed absorbing the resulting supply. If this pattern of
growth is to be reversed, the growth of investment must fall well
below that of GDP and consumption must be dramatically
augmented. In our framework, the economy should re-establish a
balance between the construction and the utilisation of produc-
tion processes at the domestic level. This transition to greater
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reliance on internal consumption might be quite bumpy, and, it
should be managed smoothly to be successful. The government
response to the crisis, that took the form of increased public invest-
ment, and incentive to private capital accumulation, sustained the
economy in the short run, but widened the imbalance between
consumption and investment, making the long run adjustment
harder and more necessary at the same time.
The global imbalances that result from the prevailing relations
between advanced and emerging countries (mainly between the
US and China), but also among advanced countries (e.g., between
Germany and Spain), take the form of national current-account
surpluses and deficits offset by net capital inflows. According to
the international intertemporal trade agreement, these global
imbalances should create no problems since surplus countries are
foregoing goods and services today but expect, in return, to receive
net goods and services tomorrow. This is what Corden (2011) calls
‘the return journey’. In this scenario, borrowing is supposed to be
aimed at financing sound investment, and to provide for the
return journey. However, what has happened is that financial
resources thus made available have actually been devoted to
finance increased current consumption and unproductive invest-
ment (housing). As a consequence, a large imbalance has appeared
between consumption and sound investment, which is not sustai-
nable. This is an example of the paradox of thrift. We must stress
that we are not only concerned with the divorce between saving
and (sound) investment, but also with the imbrications of succes-
sive disequilibria that push economies out of their stability
corridor.
Focusing on the distortions between investment and consump-
tion as the engine driving the evolution of the economy, and
identifying them as one of the main causes that pushed economies
out of their stability corridor, helps to better understand the
intrinsic complexity of the situation. This also reveals how diffi-
cult is to elaborate exit strategies for macroeconomic policies. Re-
establishing a better co-ordination between investment and
consumption will take time. Governments should be able both to
smooth short-term fluctuations, and, at the same time, to favour a
restructuring of the economy. It would then be a mistake to focus
on fiscal consolidation and to ask to implement structural policies
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as if the only problem were to re-establish a balanced public
budget. Nevertheless, the old Keynesian recipes are also not
enough, because as the case of China teaches, they may worsen the
co-ordination problems the economy faces. The transition paths
should take place in such a way as to correct existing distortions,
which means obtaining greater reliance on investment in some
countries, on consumption in other ones, while sustaining aggre-
gate demand in the short run. In both cases, this requires
adjustments in the structure of the productive capacity and even-
tually in the distribution of income and wealth. Such changes take
time and must be managed in a way that prevents the economy to
experiment too strong fluctuations in the meantime. The real chal-
lenge is to co-ordinate and harmonize short-term and long-term
policies. This may require that inflationary pressures and budget
deficits are accepted for a while, when not sought for. Structural
policies should not be oriented towards more flexibility on the
market, but, at the opposite, they should favor rigidities that
permit smoothing the necessary adjustments. Indeed, “the crisis
has also put to the test long-standing dogmas that blame labor-
market rigidity for unemployment, because countries with more
flexible wages, like the U.S., have fared worse than northern Euro-
pean economies, including Germany” (Stiglitz, 2011).
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Appendix:
Analytical Elements of an Out-Of-Equilibrium Model
A.1. Technology
The two elements of complementarity and time-to-build can be
introduced via an Hicksian representation of technology (Hicks,
1970; 1973): Consider a sequential economy of a neo-Austrian type
which uses a homogeneous labour resource. Labour is inputted for
n periods to build the productive capacity, and used for the
following N to operate it and obtain a final output. An elementary
process of production is defined by input coefficients such that: 
(A.1)
and output coefficients 
(A.2)
We usually assume that ai
c = ac, ai
u = au, and bi = b, even if any
time profile can be modeled through the appropriate choice of
vectors. The productive capacity of the economy is given by the
number of processes in use at the moment t, in construction, xc(t)
and in utilization, xu(t):
(A.3)
 This capacity is subject to ageing and to modifications due to
investment and scrapping of processes in case of financial
constraints.
Alternatively, especially if the construction phase is short
enough, it can be assumed that the production function takes the
form of a Leontief function with dated labor input
(A.4)
 with q denoting quantity produced, and l denoting labour
imput either at time t or at t-1. Thus, dated and current labor (lt–1
and lt) concur in fixed proportions to the determination of produc-
tion q ; this formulation is equivalent to assuming capital, built by
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Both with an Hicksian and a Leontief technology, past "invest-
ment" may constrain current production: if firms don't possess the
appropriate amount of capital/dated labor, they will not be able to
produce as much as they wish. The Leontief representation is
analytically more treatable, whereas the Hicksian representation
allows a finer description of the time structure of production.
A.2. Expectations
We discussed at length, above, why short term expectations
(also called intraperiod) need to be anchored in past behaviour. A
general formulation, for a generic variable x (usually expected
demand) contains three terms:
(A.5)
 The first is the past value of the variable; the second is the
‘normal’ value, and the third is an error correction term. An appro-
priate choice of the coefficients φ γ and δ allows to describe a wide
range of adaptive behaviours. Steady state/ equilibrium values may
anchor long term or interperiod expectations (for example those
affecting variables like investment, in human and physical
capital). In this case, in eq. expect, we would have φ = δ = 0 and
γ = 1 so that xe = x*.
A.3. Prices
Out-of-equilibrium models borrow from the fix-price literature
(Hicks, 1939; Malinvaud, 1977; Bénassy, 1982), the idea that
disequilibria are absorbed by quantity adjustments (short-side
rule), while prices only change discretely over time. Analytically,
this is obtained by having wages and prices fixed within periods,
and adjustments that take place only between the periods (the
Hicksian ‘weeks’). The adjustment can simply follow previous
excess demand (D-S), for example
(A.6)
 ωj is an indicator of price flexibility that nevertheless, as the
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vior. Alternatively, one can have a formulation that echoes the
Calvo (1983) partial adjustment scheme:
(A.7)
 with ψ denoting the fraction of firms adapting their price to its
optimal value at each period.
A.4. Quantity Adjustments
The short side rule applies to obtain equilibrium in most
markets. The actual value of a variable is thus computed as 
(A.8)
The markets subject to quantity adjustments may be goods,
labour or financial markets.
A.5. The Sequence
We said before that the time structure of the model is generally
obtained through a sequence of periods linked by state variables
such as the quantity of (dated) labor embedded in production
processes, the stocks that result from past disequilibria, and past
prices and wages. The interperiod sequence is complemented by an
intraperiod sequence that allows the emergence of disequilibria:
Prices and wages change in response to market disequilibria,
even if we do not let them clear markets (eqs. A.6 or A.7).
Firms form expectations (eq. A.5), Given expectations, the tech-
nology (eqs. A.1, A.2 and A.3 or A.4), and the stock of dated labor
lt–1, firms decide desired demand (for labor and external funds, in
case the internal funds from previous periods are not sufficient)
and supply (of goods).
The first market that opens is the financial market, in which
demand for external funds may be rationed (eq. A.8). Financial
constraints cause a rescaling of labor demand.
Total labor employed is determined once the second market,
the labor market opens, where once again eq. A.8 determines
whether unemployment or a human resource constraint appears.
Then wages are paid, and production is carried over. Households
form their demand based on the actual wage perceived.
11t tp p ( )p ,ψ ψ∗ −= + −
d s
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Finally, the product market opens; as in the other markets,
rationing may appear. Rationing in the goods and labor market
will determine the change in prices and wages between periods, as
well the stocks carried on from period to period.
